Friday, May 25, 2007

LTTE steps up attacks against military

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) have stepped up its attacks against the military killing 11 security personnel during yesterday alone in two separate incidents. A pre dawn attack on the SLN installation in Delft killed 10 navy patrolmen and a claymore explosion targeting army transport in Pettah killed 1 soldier and wounded 6 others.

At y esterday dawn, LTTE sea tiger units made an amphibious assault on the main SLN installation in Delft. Sea tigers used a total of 18 boats including 6 suicide craft in the offensive. The initial wave caused the defending navy personnel to abandon their original positions and pull back into the island. This allowed the LTTE to capture several mounted weapons and ammunitions deployed in the FDL. The Navy was able to regain lost ground with the help of additional FACs and SLAF after a few hours. This attack could be the beginning of another attempt to capture the Jaffna peninsula which is currently held under army control. Although pro rebel media claim a SLN casualty figure of 35, DefenceNet learns that this is false. Only 10 SLN personnel have died and LTTE casualty figure cannot be verified. However the outcome of this attack can be termed as a 'moral victory' for the LTTE as most of the attackers were able to return to their base with captured weapons.


  1. LTTE preparing for a major attack in the North?
    K.S. Rajkumar from Jaffna, May 25. LTTE is making preparations for a large-scale attack on Sri Lankan military detachments, according to several informed sources in the Vanni. The Tigers have stepped up their recruitment drive in Vanni and several LTTE units are undergoing extensive training in various areas of Vanni for this upcoming operation. According to the information available, LTTE leader is planning to stage simultaneous attacks on the military detachments from air, sea and land. Former Batticaloa commander Bhanu has been entrusted with ground operations while, Col. Nagulan is supposedly in charge of naval operations. Interestingly the LTTE leaders son Charles Antony is reported to be deeply involved in the planning of air operations for this massive operation. About 300 cadres, most of them recently conscripted children, are undergoing training in Mallavi for the initial frontal attacks on the FDL’s.

    LTTE has also moved their artillery unit named Pandyan unit to Thunukkai area in anticipation of the operation.

    During the last few weeks LTTE aircraft have been observed flying along the Iraniativu coast at very low altitudes. Several sea tiger boats were also seen along this island, located 15 miles north of Mannar. Sea Tigers maintain a large base in Nachchikudah. Incidentally it was from this same location that the LTTE shot down a Lion Air aircraft, killing all 55 people on board in 1998. In the last two weeks, Sea tigers have warned fishermen in Nachchikudah area to stay away from the area around Iranitivu.

    LTTE leaders plan, according to some sources within the LTTE, is to introduce his son, Charles Antony as the key military planner and strategist for the movement, if the massive operation succeeds. LTTE's air wing is reportedly under the direction of a man identified as Kennedy. LTTE leader's son, Charles Antony, is reportedly trained in aviation engineering in Europe, and is currently a key figure in the LTTE's air wing.

    In the last two weeks, LTTE and TNA politicians have emphasized the need for the LTTE to demonstrate its military powers. On Tuesday, TNA MP Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam was quoted in TamilNet as saying that "Sri Lanka will not pursue a political solution until it finds itself unable to prosecute a military solution, and the only option open for peace is for the LTTE to demonstrate that Colombo's military agenda will not succeed".

    The current line of thinking within the LTTE was further confirmed by the LTTE political head Tamilselvan who in recent days stated that the "Balance of power is imperative for finding the solution".

  2. 10 SLA Soldiers Injured in Clash with LTTE in Amparai

    Ten Sri Lanka Army soldiers were injured in a confrontation with the LTTE rebels Friday early morning at Tampitiya, Pullumalai in the Amparai district.

    The injured men were rushed Maha Oya hospital.

    Two of them were in a critical condition and had to be taken to the Amparai hospital.

  3. "moral victory"

    I have the feeling that LTTE is trying to boost the sagging morale by reverting to this kind of attacks after the SLA gains in Mannar and DPU attacks in Kilinochchi. It is even more interesting to see how LTTE is going to achieve the same objective they couldn't achieve last year after the simultaneous attacks in Trinco and Jaffna. I believe (hope) that our force are ready and geared up to face this threat preemptively, not reactively. Also, we shouldn't forget that this can be disinformation to divert attention in an attempt to attack elsewhere. I desperately hope that DMI is running full steam these days.

    Bless our motherland and great soldiers!

  4. folks,

    Below is from

    "According to the latest information the self styled "Colonel" Nagulan, the person in charge of LTTE's Charles Anthony band; "Major" Maniwannan Master, the LTTE's intelligence coordinator for Batticaloa and; LTTE female cadre Mala, a senior member of LTTE's Sothiya band were also among the dead LTTE cadres. Two photographs taken of themselves with terror chief V. Prbakaran were also found with two dead LTTE cadres. The bodies were later handed over to the ICRC."

    I hope this is all true that we got Nagulan, is this true or mistaken identity?

  5. LRRP attack has killed 3 LTTE regional leaders.

  6. Defencenet,

    "LRRP attack has killed 3 LTTE regional leaders."

    thanks for the grerat new. Bless our motherland and great soldiers!

  7. "LTTE has also moved their artillery unit named Pandyan unit to Thunukkai area in anticipation of the operation."

    I thought the Pandyan were like their special forces? I believe the artillery units had a different name, I think named after Kittu? So not sure how acurate this article itself is when the author make such mistakes.

  8. I hear my detractors say the same thing over and over agian. I do not want to wast my time. I hope to remind those people of Corporal Gamini Kularatne.

    Could any of you place a website to honour him. Find out what his family is doing. Does his family need any financial support. Rather then comming to this website everyday and by words say I am proud of the army, country etc.

  9. I'm beginning to think, despite all the talk of bullock carts and Benz cars, that acquiring MiG-29s may not be that bad a decision. If all these news reports are right and the LTTE is planning a large-scale land, sea and air attack, we really need to neutralize their aircraft beforehand. Because our soldiers are really not prepared to deal with air attacks while the LTTE launches mass attacks like they did last August. If we could have MiGs patrolling the areas the LTTE uses to train their aircrews, and are able to take a few of them out, that will be a big blow to their plans. Any ground base defenses could only come into play while the attack is ongoing, which may be too late.

    And if the weekend newspapers are right and we are looking at the multi-role SM variant, it will let the Air Force carry out air strikes with a lot greater precision that our current Kfirs and Mig-27s allow. Given the way the LTTE uses civilians as human shields to defend their bases, that would be a good thing, militarily and in the propaganda sense..

  10. navindran,

    FYI, most of the people I am surrounded with contribute to SL forces welfare in many ways. What I do to help our soldiers is not public information even though I have mentioned earlier and I do it as my duty to the nation. I believe that it is true for many of the bloggers.

  11. navindran,

    "Could any of you place a website to honour him. Find out what his family is doing. Does his family need any financial support. Rather then comming to this website everyday and by words say I am proud of the army, country etc."

    May be you also can help our motherland rather than comming to this website everyday and try to publish baseless information.

  12. I have very superficial military knowledge. But what do you all think about using DPUs to locate where these mosquitos are located. May be they won't be able to get close but should know with the kind of resistance they may face.

    Also an attack is highly likely mobilising their air unit as they know the SLDF is now preparing for the threat and they want make most of whatever advantage they still have, and since it seems that their cowardly tactics of trying to stop the offensive don't seem to be working this time around.

    I was rather skeptical about buying the mig 29s, but as illegal.existence points out this may not be bad idea after all.

    Top priority must be given to destroying LTTE air capability.

    The LTTE air capability gives a grim partition in to an alternative universe where the LTTE has managed to secure eelam and is able to build their military machinery without any hindrance at all. Will we have peace then? What will they come up with? There'll be squadrons and squandrons of air craft, super sonic jets even self styled stealth bombers only limited by their imagination and funds going for the total annihilation of the southern state. The LTTE air should open everybodies eyes to the reality that there is not solution without defeating separatist terrorism.

  13. The Imran Paandiyan isn't an arty unit, nor is it sf. It is considered an elite, however, and there was taalk that it's equipped with armour.

  14. Tigers Launch Pre-Dawn Amphibious Assault in Delft

    By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

    Specialised sea - borne units of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched an amphibious assault in the early hours of May 24th on the Sri Lankan Navy stationed at the Northern Island of Delft. Apart from killing and injuring at least ten navy men the tigers seized a radar unit and also took away a cache of arms and ammunition.

    While the LTTE claims that at least 35 security personnel were killed and three vessels including a Dvora gun boat were damaged, the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) has denied it. Likewise the GOSL claims of having inflicted destruction on the yigers and repulsing the attack after a protracted battle have been rejected by the LTTE

    Delft is the largest of Jaffna’s off - shore Islands and Islets numbering Seventy - eight. Only thirteen of these are inhabited. The Island is called Neduntheevu meaning long Island in Tamil. It’s Sinhala name is Pokurudivaina. Delft was the name given by the Dutch who named it after a city in South Holland. Delft in Netherlands is located between Rotterdam and the Hague. It is known for its canals and its blue pottery known as Delftware.

    [Delft Municipal Hall, Holland]

    Neduntheevu or Delft is around 18.3 sq miles or roughly 42 sq km in size. It is 45 km from Jaffna but only 38 km away from Rameshwaram in Inda’s Tamil Nadu coast. Delft is roughly 6 km in length from north to South and about 8km from east to west. The Island has a population of around 5000 people.

    [A statue of the Virgin Mary on Delft Island holding a fishing boat, to protect the fishermen at sea.]

    The off - shore Islands of Jaffna have been generally under the authority of the Sri Lankan navy. The SLN is assisted in law - enforcement and security by the Police and in a para - military capacity by the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP). The navy has a small base in the northern part of Delft near the main jetty known as Maavilithurai .

    This jetty is Delft’s main link to the outside world. People in Delft travel to and from Jaffna by ferry .The two ferry points are b Mavili thurai in Neduntheevu and Kurikadduvaan in Punkudutheevu. Punkudutheevu in turn is approachable by road from Jaffna due to the Pannai causeway built in 1960.

    The Navy set up a radar station last year in the Southern part of the Island near the old light house. A second detachment of navy personnel was stationed nearby to protect the radar unit and generally the Southern seas. A guard unit was deployed at the radar unit vicinity itself. Contacts between the navy in the north and South was mainly by land.

    There are a few sentry posts along the single main road in Delft. There are no sentries at these posts during night.All personnel return to the two camps after nightfall.

    Given its proximity to Rameshwaram, Jafna, Pooneryn and even Mannar the island of Delft is strategically significant. The LTTE has been using the Island for years as a key point in crossing over and back from India. For instance when former northern commander Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar alias “Col” Kittu was injured on March 30th 1987 in a bomb attack his deputies took him to Rameshwaram from Kurikadduvaan via Neduntheevu.

    In recent times Delft became crucially important to monitor and restrict LTTE sea movements off the North - Western and to some extent the northern coasts of Sri Lanka. The tigers rely to a great extent on Tamil Nadu for procuring supplies like fuel, non - perishable foods, medical supplies and mechanical equipment. The naval presence in Delft and usage of radar was an irritant if not deterrent to the LTTE in this sphere. Delft’s importance in sea surveillance cannot be underestimated.

    [Children in Delft]

    It was shortly after midnight around 12.30 am when sea - borne LTTE cadres landed surreptitiously in the beach area known as Vellai in the South - west of Delft. These were areas where migrant fishermen set up their temporary “Vaadis”.Delft along with Thalaiaddy in Vadamaratchy east are two places in Jaffna district where the “karaivalai” dragnets are used for seasonal fishing.

    The tigers who landed at the beaches of Vellai split up in two formations. One group swiftly encircled the radar station navy detachment premises. The second group went around the detachment and advanced further. This group set up a “cut - out” point and stationed itself midway between the Northern and Southern naval detachments. This was to prevent navymen in the North coming to the rescue of beleagured comrades in the South.

    The assault squad launched its attack on naval premises around 12. 45 am. Some sailors were taken by surprise.The shoot - out lasted till 1.05 am. In twenty minutes the radar unit guard station was over run. At least eight navy personnel were killed in the initial skirmish.

    Exchanges of fire continued between the LTTE and those at the detachment. Even as intermittent firing continued LTTE cadres began systematically removing equipment. machinery at the radar unit and guard station. The arsenal was also ransacked.

    The LTTE cadres dismantled the radar unit carefully and removed it from premises.. They also seized some weapons from the sailors including three .50 calibre guns, two PK LmG’s, one RPG launcher, eight T- 56 rifles and one AK LMG. The tigers also took a large number of ammunition and shells.

    The tigers then began moving out with their booty. The big prize was of course the radar. Initially the tigers may have planned on knocking the radar out but found themselves able to seize it and take it away altogether.

    [Coral in Delft]

    There were 20 to 25 navy men in the Southern and 30 to 35 men in the Northern detachments. A small group of navy men in motor vehicles set out from the North to aid the South. LTTE cadres at the cut - out set up by the tigers fired at vehicles. The Navy men retreated without pursuing their intended mission.

    Once this happened the navy men holding out at the Southern detachment were de- moralised. Until that time they had fought hard inflicting injuries on the LTTE and even killing a few tigers. Once they realised re-inforcements would not be coming soon the defenders fled the camp and took cover in the shrub jungles and palmyrah groves.

    A flotilla of tiger boats had been deployed at the Southern coastline. While some boats were used to transport cadres and seized military assets , the mission of other vessels was to prevent naval re-inforcements from Kayts and Karainagar reaching the scene.

    Eventually three water jet boats and two Dvora gunboats reached the Island around 2.30 am. The gunboats came from Karainagar while waterjets came from Talaimannar.The LTTE boats then engaged these naval vessels at sea off the coast of Poomunai and Samithottamunai. A few tigers were hit in these clashes.

    Even as the sea skirmishes occurred the tigers on land began moving out.By 2. 45 am the LTTE withdrew completely from Delft after setting off explosives at the naval base and radar station. But as far as sections of the security personnel were concerned the fight did not end. The navy on land fired contiuously till 4. 30 am giving residents the impression that clashes were continuing.

    Meanwhile the LTTE flotilla with cadres and seized military assets on board sailed speedily away. The navy did not give chase but remained close to Neduntheevu coast firing shells sporadically in the direction taken by the tiger flotilla.

    The tiger flotilla split up and sailed down to the main sea tiger base at Nacchikudah and two other sea tiger bases at Vidathaltheevu and Pooneryn.

    It was after first light that Air force jets came to Delft. More naval vessels also arrived. Thereafter an elaborate search and destroy mission was conducted. In reality it was nothing but a charade. The LTTE cadres and vessels had safely returned unhindered to base hours ago.

    It was during daylight that more security personnel were brought from mainland to Delft. A massive combing operation was undertaken. Some injured navy men and others in hiding were located and rescued. By 3 pm the Navy confidently reported that Delft was under total control.

    Then came the disinformation and misinformation war. The LTTE had beaten the defence establishment by being the first to break the story of the attack. LTTE defence affairs spokesperson Rasiah Ilanthiraiyan claimed that the naval detachment at Delft had been demolished and at least 35 navy men were killed.

    Ilanthiraiyan also said two water jet speedboats were damaged. Also A Dvora in trouble after colliding with a coral reef had sustained extensive damage.The impression sought to be conveyed was that the Delft navy had been given a death blow.

    The GOSL propagandists though late tried to outdo the LTTE in “spin”.They claimed that two boats of the LTTE were destroyed by the navy. They also claimed that the airforce had bombed three of the tiger boats at Nachikuda. The LTTE claim regarding naval casualties was also denied.

    The LTTE stated initially that only four of their cadres were killed. The GOSL put the LTTE toll much higher. Likewise Ilanthiraiyan placed the Navy casualty figure at over 30. The GOSL denied it flatly.

    The LTTE later revealed that seven cadres including two women were killed. They were Sinnathurai Vijayakala alias Thamilventhan, Veerasingham Aingaran alias Muhilan, Panchalingam Suhanthan alias Sugirthan, Santhirasekaran Mayooran alias Sreemaran, Kathiripillai Mariyagowri alias Kalaithendral, Sebastianpillai Mary Kanishta alias Thanivizhi, and Francis punithakumar alias Kadalmainthan.

    The tigers killed in the Delft attack were posthumously promoted. They comprised one major, three captains, two lieutnenants and one second lieutnenant. The LTTE cadres were from Jaffna, Mannar and Mullaitheevu districts. Cadres hailing from Neduntheevu had participated in large numbers in the attack.

    The media centre for national security listened to details of LTTE casualties being relayed over tiger radio. Then the MCNS announced the names saying it had intercepted LTTE communications.

    The Navy maintains an official casualty figure of four dead and four injured. But unofficially sources say that around 8- 10 were killed and 6 - 8 injured.

    While LTTE media described the Neduntheevu attack as a great success the GOSL claimed the attack had been repulsed by the navy and air force.

    Once again the GOSL and its propagandists seemed to have missed the forest for the trees. The important thing in the attack was not the extent of damage caused but the fact that it had happened. LTTE boats numbering 16 - 18 had been able to proceed from a South - western point on the mainland and travel undetected by sea to Delft and surprise the navy.

    Apparently four LTTE formations comprising males and females were engaged in the operation. The sea tigers, black sea tigers , a special amphibian force and a special commando force were involved. The amphibian and marine commando units were modelled on the US Marine corps and SEALS. The LTTE like Eklavya emulating Drona in the “Mahabharatha” had trained these elite formations on the lines of the US marines.

    The LTTE’s first major amphibian attack was in 1993 when the Pooneryn - Nagathevanthurai naval complex was attacked. The Tigers came across the lagoon in rafts to escape detection. The operation was then codenamed “Thavalai” or frog. The frog is an amphibean. That name was chosen to signify the amphibious nature of that attack.

    Nowadays a whole amphibious unit has been developed.It is called “eeroodaha Sirappu Thaakkuthal ani” by LTTE media. It is reported that the amphibious unit was involved in the attack on Mandaitheevu last August 12th. That attack was a failure and several tigers were killed.

    Assertions are made in the Colombo media that the LTTE had intended capturing Delft and was thwarted by the navy and air force. These views seem incorrect. In the first place the LTTE assault force deployed in the operation was not large enough to take over Delft.

    More importantly the tigers could not have held on to Delft even if they had taken it over. Given the superior airpower, seapower, manpower and firepower of the armed forces the tigers would have been sitting ducks had they tried to hold Delft.

    The operation was aimed at giving a shock to the navy and removing an irritant temporarily at least. The radar unit in Southern Delft was of immense use to the navy in monitoring sea movement by the tigers in that maritime zone. The operation intended knocking out the surveillance facility. But luck favoured the LTTE and it has been able to take the whole radar away.

    This does not mean that the GOSL would not substitute another radar in due course but for some time at least there wont be one.The Delft radar point was of crucial importance in monitoring sea tiger movements from Pooneryn, Vidathaltheevu and Nachikudah. It was also useful in monitoring air tiger flights hugging the Mannar coast.

    The LTTE has proven a point through this attack. The tigers have demonstrated that they are capable of launching a successful amphibious operation like this and return home safely. This, like the air strikes are all pointers to the fact that the LTTE may be down but is not out. Once again the tiger has crouched to pounce.

    The LTTE did not attempt the capture of Delft because the tigers would have been trapped in the Island if they had done so. But the people of Delft are in a perpetual trap and therefore highly vulnerable. The LTTE attack on the navy happened on May 24th. Another incident which happened twenty - two years ago in the month of may illustrates the plight of the people.

    [Memorial to those perished on May 14, 1985]

    On May 14th 1985 a tiger squad raided Anuradhapura and killed many people. On May 15th passengers from Delft boarded the “Kumudini” ferry at Mavilithurai pier to go to Kurikadduvan jetty. A navy boat intercepted “Kumudini” at a short distance from the shore. The sailors in an apparent act of revenge for the Anuradhapura massacre began attacking the innocent Delft civilians. 38 people were shot and.or hacked brutally to death. A monument in memory of these innocent victims has been erected near the Mavilithurai jetty.

    What happened in May 15th 1985 was an act of certain individuals in the navy. It had no official sanction. Punishing innocent people living in one place for something perpetrated by others elsewhere is neither just nor prudent. Yet this practice has now become officially sanctioned under the Rajapakse regime.

    When Army chief Sarath Fonseka was injured in a bomb attack at the Army headquarters on April 25th last year the immediate consequence was bombing of innocent civilians in Sampoor. Retaliatory measures on the powerless and innocent have become the order of the day under this bully of a regime.

    The successful LTTE attack on the navy at Delft too is resulting in consequences affecting civilians. All transport to and from the Islands was curtailed throughout Thursday after the attack.A massive search operation was conducted in various parts of the Islands. Delft, Kayts, Velanai, Nainatheevu, Punkudutheevu etc suffered.

    Also all fishing has been forbidden until further notice. Again this ban does not apply to Delft alone but to all the Islands as well as areas on the mainland like Gurunagar, Pashaiyoor, Naavanthurai etc. Once again the familiar excuse of tigers masquerading as fisherfolk is being trotted out.But such an excuse is totally wrong because it is widely acknowledged that the tigers came in sea tiger boats.

    An unofficial curfew has been imposed on the three Island AGA divisions of Delft, Kayts and Velanai. All transport to Delft has been cut off for the second successive day. There is much concern about the safety of civilians in Delft. Reportedly Neduntheevu residents are being “interrogated” intensively.

    The security forces particularly the navy are engaged in these measures in a misguided , vengeful spirit. The reality is that the navy failed miserably in detecting and countering the LTTE sea borne attack. The fault lies within and not outside the navy. Instead of harassing and victimising innocent Tamil civilians and fisherfolk ,the navy would do better to probe its own conduct, identify shortcomings and rectify matters.

  15. You will see how much of false information is spread by both sides by reading the above article.

  16. Civillians are interrogated because LTTE cadres who infiltrated the island earlier had opened fire from ground when their sea born units landed. Its speculated that such members are still trapped in Delft.

    By B.Raman

    Till March 26,2007, the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) enjoyed the command of the skies. There was no opposition to its punitive strikes against the positions held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTW) in the Eastern and Northern Provinces and to its intimidatory strikes against the Sri Lankan Tamil population, inflicting a large number of civilian casualties. The LTTE faced difficulty in countering the punitive and intimidatory air strikes of the SLAF. This was due to a serious depletion of its anti-aircraft capability and the difficulties faced by it in procuring anti-aircraft guns and ammunition and surface-to-air missiles.

    2. As a result of this, the Sri Lankan authorities did not consider it necessary to provide strengthened anti-aircraft defences to their army, naval and air force stations in the Tamil areas. They feared only land-based threats to them. They did not anticipate any threat from the air.

    3. The position has since changed as a result of the LTTE's Tamil Eelam Air Force (TAF) going into action since March 26,2007, and demonstrating its capability for conventional air operations on ground-based targets and to evade the anti-aircraft defences. The TAF has already carried out three successful air strikes on ground targets of a strategic significance----two in the Colombo area and one in the Jaffna area.

    4. The psychological and economic impact of these strikes has unnerved the Sri Lankan authorities. The psychological impact has been in denting the self-confidence of the Sri Lankan security forces and affecting their credibility in the eyes of the public. The economic impact has been on tourism. Flights of nervous international airlines were affected and there was a decline in tourist arrivals.

    5. The expected operations of the armed forces to recover territory under the control of the LTTE in the Northern Province have not yet materialised. The SLAF has not been as active as it used to be before the TAF went into action. Fearing more strikes by the TAF, the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has given priority to strengthening the anti-aircraft defences in Colombo and Jaffna. Apart from taking conventional measures such as providing anti-aircraft guns and ammunition to all major military posts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it has also entered into negotiations with Pakistan and China for the purchase of surface-to-air missiles.

    6. Taking advantage of this, the LTTE has embarked on a policy of identifying military posts where anti-aircraft defences have been set up, raiding them and capturing the anti-aircraft weapons supplied to them. It was in pursuance of this tactics that the LTTE raided a strategic naval base at Delft, an islet off the northern Jaffna peninsula, shortly after midnight on May 24,2007, dismantled its anti-aircraft defences and took away two anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, two Israeli machine guns, one rocket-propelled grenade launcher and eight assault rifles. They badly damaged the base infrastructure and withdrew after killing over 20 sailors of the Sri Lankan Navy. The raid lasted about two hours. The officers at the base frantically kept asking for an air strike against the raiding Sea Tigers and their boats, but the SLAF did not come to their help. Later, it claimed that the SLAF went into action and attacked the Sea Tiger boats as they were withdrawing and inflicted casualties and damage. There has been no corroboration of this so far.

    7.The Government has not yet been able to remove the nervousness caused in Sri Lankan and foreign business circles----particularly among those in the civil aviation and tourism sectors---in the wake of the TAF's air raids in the Colombo area. Fear of an LTTE retaliation from the air continues to have a negative impact on the Government and the Security Forces.

  18. A note of caution. Though news articles are informative they are also getting their information from secondary sources. Ramman is retired and needs to write as quickly and as sensationally as possible to be relevant. Not denying that there are facts attached to the DBS article and ramman article, sometimes i wonder how much information they get is reliable as both are not in Sri Lanka.

    If DBS was right, I am disappointed with the guys who came to rescue the camp. Their retreat caused those defending it to lose morale and themselves retreat. This changed the intial LTTE plan to destroy the base and allowed them to ransack the place.

    Calling the SBS and air support before even attempting a fight back is not good. I guess those guys in the island might have thought that the deft island deployment was easy and never anticipated an attack.

    It falls back to the logic is that you do not expect the next batsmen to come and bowl a century. Likewise you do not hope poor batting can be overcome by good bowling or vice versa.

    If the FDL falls the next line is under extreme pressure to hold the line and so on so fourth.

  19. A reminder of what should have been done: Captain Saliya Upul Aladeniya (PWV, WWV) (1964 - June 11, 1990) was a Sri Lankan soldier who refused to abandon the injured of his platoon and, fought until the Kokavil army camp was overrun by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam attackers. He was awarded the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya, the highest award for valour of the Sri Lanka Army.

    Lieutenant (at that time) Aladeniya was in command of an army outpost with a handful of men at Kokuvla (Kokavil) that was established for guarding the television relay station. The camp was surrounded for several days by LTTE cadres who outnumbered them five to one. The food and water were running out in the camp and so was the ammunition. In spite of many requests, reinforcements sent from Lt. Aladeniya's regimental headquarters in Nuwara Eliya never reached Kokavil, having been diverted elsewhere. Orders to withdraw from the camp came at the eleventh hour but then it was too late and Aladeniya had wounded men whom he did not want to leave behind. Pledging that he would rather die alongside them than leave them, Lt. Aladeniya fought on till an adjacent fuel dump exploded, killing the majority of the defenders in the camp.

    Lt. Aladeniya lost his life and was posthumously promoted to rank of captain and honoured with a Parama Weera Vibhushanaya medal on June 21, 1994.

  20. I agree with many of the points made by DBS especially that the LTTE could not have even hoped to hold Delft in the face of the full force of the air force and navy.
    How come the island didn't have more of a navy presence considering that this is the most west-wardly island and a vital outpost to monitor and deter LTTE sea movements to S.India?
    I just can't understand why reinforcements in the form of air assets were not rushed in. Is this reflecting the fear of the TAF retaliating against our economic targets? Hopefully a fellow defencenet member can shed light on this matter. If this is true then this is a disastrous move on the SLDFs part.

  21. As Navindran says, DBS is writing things as he has been an eye witness but he is staying far away from sri lanka and he writes things so wonderfully well that we feel that is a document done by a field journalist. the fact is that most of his articles are biased to the LTTE. When LTTE is getting gud punches like what they had in wakarei were not included in his articles.The remarks that he has put were not there in any of the international news article or site except the pro LTTE websites. So the information he must be getting from either one part of the conflict thats SL army or LTTE. If we carefully read the article we cn understand that he has tried very hard to show that he is impartial but overall he has tried to show the LTTE is far supirior in thier tactics than the army. Sarcastic part of that is that he is camparing US navy seals to LTTE goons. AS pro LTTE media such as tamilnet is concerned we know that they are posting false information and the ceridbilty of those website have seriaously lost so this might be a new phase of LTTE's propaganda war.They were wery good in using this tactic to win the faith of some our senior intelligence officers by giving little tips and gaining their confidence making way to thier final plan. so we need not to hurry befor accepting wut jeyaraj says. Wut is your opinion guys ..

  22. Its not that the military is unaware about DBS or ramman stance. However they are useful to the military and vice versa.

    The military inteligence sometimes would want certain information out so that its to be read by the LTTE. Some officers in the military might also want to give information to DBS/Raman so that senior military commanders and political leaders do not go unpunished for their mistakes and failures which have led to soldiers being killed and military losses.

    The worst is disgruntled officers who are unhappy over a promotion or posting passing information in frustration. DBS/Raman would need to play the neutral role as they need to ensure the information is forthcomming the next round. Hence somewhere along the way we need to decipher the truth by our own judgements.

    Blogs like this gives people intrested in the military details a chance to debate and dicuss the issues.

    Hence its simple case of military politicking and everyone has a indentified role that they play by it. Whathever it may be I feel its unfair to punish journalist like Iqbal Athas. They are at least providing abit of information more than the typical we loss 1 person they lost 10 story from both sides.

    As they say do not shoot the messenger.

  23. In the Raman article he postulates that the delft naval garrison was attacked to obtain the AAA systems that they may/may not have had there. Is there any possibility that this could be true?
    Would a small base like that be equipped with AAA weapons?

  24. "In the Raman article he postulates that the delft naval garrison was attacked to obtain the AAA systems that they may/may not have had there. Is there any possibility that this could be true?
    Would a small base like that be equipped with AAA weapons? "

    He is talking about the .50 cal AA guns, but I have seen the LTTE using those more on boats and as land weapons than in an AA role (as they would be ineffective against anything but slow low flying targets).

    Anyway I think he is wrong, they wanted to destroy the radar, but it seems they even managed to capture it. Even the defence ministry is admitting the radar is gone one way or the other.

    "Both sides suffered casualties, but defence sources said the bigger loss to the military was a coastal radar station at Delft that was used to track gunrunning across the narrow Palk Straits between India and Sri Lanka.


  25. "Eighteen elite commandos of Sri Lankan Special Task Force (STF) were wounded Saturday when the STF launched an offensive into Liberation Tigers controlled Kudumpimalai (Thoppigala) jungles, 36 km northwest of Batticaloa city, Sri Lankan police officials in Batticaloa said"

    Does defencenet have any comment on this item in Tamilnet? Any truth to it? Don't see any mention on the MCNS page.

  26. Catastrophe facing Tamils in Jaffna

    By: Rajasingham Jayadevan

    Sources close to the LTTE hierarchy in Vanni confirms LTTE has finalised its plans to carryout a major operation to take control of the Jaffna peninsula.

    In a meeting held at the LTTE supremo Velupillai Pirabakaran's hideout in Vanni recently, attended by his trusted Pottu and other commanders, plans were submitted to take forward the final war to wrest control of the Jaffna peninsula.

    Pottu is the LTTE's head of intelligence gathering has presented his findings and have said any forward move to take control of Jaffna peninsula would lead to deaths of 50,000 civilians and LTTE must be prepared to loose its own cadres numbering 8,000. 'As this is going to be the final assault, we must be prepared to accept the eventualities' he had said in the meeting.

    The LTTE military meetings are always monotonous presentation by one attending the meeting and those present did not make any comments to the briefing given by Pottu. However, Pirabakaran has asked whether there are ways to reduce the casualties. Pottu has firmly said LTTE must be prepared to accept very high number of casualties on this occasion.

    The current round of fighting which started in November 2005 with attacks on the Sri Lankan forces by the so-called LTTE's people's brigade has progressed as undeclared war between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The civilian population in the Tamil areas are sandwiched between the government security forces and the LTTE and any forward move by the LTTE to take control of Jaffna will cause deaths and destruction of unimaginable scale. The people have no way to extricate themselves from predicament looming for them.

    Further news reaching from Kilinochchi confirms LTTE is carrying out a massive drive to recruit children to strengthen its ranks. The sources say Jaffna University students who went to their homes to be with their parents in Vanni during the university recess too have been forcefully taken away for training by the LTTE. The Vanni based students reached their homes after making arduous journey through Trincomalee plying by ships there.

    The sources further state LTTE has given instructions to its operatives in Tamil Nadu to go around and meet the families migrated there recently to get the youngsters to return to Vanni. One family in London who's close relative moved to Chennai said 'we are fearing for the safety of our young relative as the LTTE has a established network in Tamil Nadu and they may forcefully take him away to Vanni'. They said they have heard LTTE is approaching potential recruits in Tamil Nadu.

  27. I pray that SLDF are ready for this. For the last couple of months we have only heard air raid after air raid taking out key sea tiger bases and most came to the conclusion that the strength of the sea tigers has been reduced greatly. But now they manage mount a successful amphibious op that caught everyone by surprise.
    The balance of recent battlefield results may be in favour of the SLDFs but the LTTE has the ability to pull off surprise victories from no where. It will only take one key victory for the tigers to retake the Jaffna peninsula.
    I still remain sceptical about the purchase of Mig-29 interceptors for the air-force but recent rumours about the much delayed upgrade of naval guns and the acquisition of Mi-35 gunships would go a long way towards our preparations for d-day.

  28. This comment has been removed by the author.

  29. Mr Wickramasinghe & Company is questioning about the country's security situation today. But everybody knows that that is his phony peace talks gives the way to tigers to buy weapons and equipments.
    Today these people and media pundits like Iqbal Athas question the expense for Mig 29s. It is this attitude of Sri Lankans drags this war for 25 years. You can’t keep your cake and eat it. We have to get rid of this war in any cost. Imagine if we had MBR Launchers in 1980’s this war could have been finished in the same decade.
    Like Japan we can rise from ashes when we defeat terrorism and achieve peace.

    May all the Gods bless our security Forces.

  30. Karuna group adopts Prabhakaran’s terror tactics to suppress Tamils of the east
    Sat, 2007-05-26 15:23
    Colombo, 26 May, ( Sivarasa Uthayakumar (19 years) from Araiyampathi, a former member of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal led by Colonel Karuna was shot dead yesterday in broad daylight in the Kaluwanchikudi market, Batticoloa, located in the east of Sri Lanka.

    Sivarasa Uthayakumar was a former militant cadre in the TMVP military wing. When TMVP split into two and factional fighting erupted in the first week of May, he left the outfit for good and was living with his parents at Ariyampathi.

    Yesterday he went to Kaluwanchikudi market to buy vegetables and other provisions for the family. In the market he was arrested by Veera, TMVP organizer for Kaluwanchikudi.

    Veera confronted Sivarasa Uthayakumar and shot and killed him in the broad daylight in the Government controlled area. After shooting the ex-militant cadre he dragged the dead body and handed over it to the Kaluwanchikudi hospital.

    Reports reveal that hundreds of people were there in the market witnessing this act of TMVP terror. Furthermore, Asian Tribune learnt that letters are sent by the political offices of the TMVP to all those who left the outfit after the split with former commander Pillaiyan urging them to return and join their respective arm units on or before 29 May.

    The letter also insists that in case the former TMVP cadre fails to turn up, parents should turn up and present themselves to the political offices for inquiry. If the cadres who had left fail to rejoin, then the family should provide another member of the family to the TMVP as a substitute, states the letter.

    “The irony is that the Tamil people, whether in the east or in the north, have no way of escaping the terrorist,” said a government official. “Also when one set of terrorist are chased out another set steps in to take over. Karuna group is now adopting Prabhakaran’s terror tactics. The Tamils abroad who pay for this terror must answer for these crimes,” he added.

  31. Alot of people here propogate that Ranil and the CFA was responsible for the LTTE bringing weapons into Sri Lanka. I think that is political bullshit. In every rule, things were brought in by the LTTE.

    The CFA might have simplified things for the LTTE but it also gave the SL armed forces a chance to regroup, get better weapons and training, study from their mistakes and bring about todays sucesses.

  32. Pillayan gives ‘final warning’ to Karuna

    * Renewed factional war threatens east as reconciliation attempts fail
    * Top aides on both sides have reportedly fled the country
    * Several Pillayan supporters allegedly under house arrest

    By Easwaran Rutnam
    A new factional war is threatening to erupt in the East as former Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) commander Pillayan issued a final warning to Karuna Amman to leave the outfit or face the ignominy of being removed by force.

    The warning comes as repeated attempts to reconcile the factional dispute between Pillayan and Karuna failed following allegations that Karuna continued to misuse TMVP funds and placed some of his enemies under house arrest as the support base for Pillayan continued to grow.

    A top TMVP source, speaking to the Daily Mirror on the condition of anonymity, said the government military was also unable to takes sides as it required the support of Pillayan to retake Thoppigala in the East and Karuna to capture Elephant Pass in the North.

    According to the source Pillayan was instrumental in providing ground intelligence to the military for the successful Eastern operations but is not familiar with the terrain in the North as much as Karuna who will be useful as the military makes attempts to wipe out the LTTE from Elephant Pass.

    The Daily Mirror also learns that several top aides of Pillayan and Karuna, including the official spokesman for the TMVP Azad Moulana, had fled the country once again as the animosity between the two sides began to flare up and cadres were being forced to decide who they would offer their allegiance to.

    Of the 1200 TMVP cadre base, 800 are now said to be in Trincomalee supporting Pillayan, which includes Thuyavan, Markan, Jeyam, Seelan and Ajith, while 400 are siding with Karuna Amman including Mangalan Master, Bharathi, Thileepan and Sinnathambi.

    A meeting held recently to reconcile the two sides had reportedly failed, despite Moulana saying otherwise to the media, and according to the source Karuna had used the opportunity to target several Pillayan associates including former spokesman Thuyavan who narrowly escaped death.

    A release issued by the Colombo office of the TMVP following a recent central committee meeting further added light to the continuing split as it was announced that Karuna had been reappointed TMVP leader and Mangalan Master as commander, replacing the position held by Pillayan.

    “Several Pillayan supporters including some female cadres are now under house arrest in Ampara and Batticaloa. The TMVP is in disarray. Amman has started killing some of Pillayan’s cadres and Pillayan has now decided to take control of Karuna camps,” the TMVP source told the Daily Mirror.

    The split initially erupted as allegations were levelled against Karuna Amman saying that he began to divert some Rs. four million of the TMVP funds to his family who are overseas despite the organisation only agreeing to allocate Rs. 1.5 million. According to the source, the TMVP had a monthly income of Rs. 160 million out of which Rs. 80 million was spent and the balance saved for future needs. However Karuna is learnt to have recently placed his close aide Iniya Bharathi in charge of the funds and allegedly swindled the money.

    An angry Pillayan questioned the move, which resulted in the split. The source further revealed that Karuna was now in the process of strengthening his base by abducting and recruiting adults and underage children.


    By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

    The Sea Tigers, the naval arm of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) carried out a successful strike on the Sri Lanka Naval detachments located in Delft Island (Nedunthivu in Tamil) on the night of Thursday, May 24, 2007. The Sea Tigers lost seven cadres and made away with weapons and equipment of the naval detachments. Though the LTTE has claimed killing 35 sailors, the Navy also probably lost an equal if not a little more seamen manning the posts. In the sea and air operations that followed, the navy has claimed knocking off at least two LTTE boats. However, the importance of the operation does not lie in the body count or the number of boats sunk as made out by both sides playing for the media galleries. It has dealt an invigorating dose of confidence to the LTTE. Coming in the wake of its successful air operations, this dose of confidence is more lethal in the long term.

    There is a need to understand this raid in the emerging overall operational scene in the north, particularly in Jaffna. The island territories of Jaffna peninsula are important outposts that provide early warning of sea movements, infiltrations, and impending sea, land and air attacks. The largest chain - Kayts group of islands - extending from Karaithivu in the north to Mandaithivu in the south, with Poonkudutivu on the south west forms a formidable barrier to seaborne infiltration into Jaffna peninsula from the west. Other than Delft, which stands on its own as the south western sentinel, these islands are well connected with causeways to the peninsula which make them part of the peninsular defence system. However, the lagoon waters around are shallow and restrict naval movement. Understanding the importance of the Kayts islands complex to the overall scheme of things, security forces had managed to control and dominate them for a long time. The Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) is present there to assist the government in ensuring that the LTTE activity does not get out of hand. Security forces had always been sensitive to LTTE infiltration into Kayts and had ruthlessly dealt with any civilian of the island suspected of LTTE affiliation.

    It might be remembered that Kayts islands had been one of the important targets of LTTE when it launched the multi-pronged offensive in August 2006 that failed. [See SAAG Note No 325 dated Aug 15, 2006 "Sri Lanka - LTTE Strikes Back -Update No. 98 available at for detailed analysis]. Almost all the LTTE infiltrators who had landed on the island were eliminated in the search and destroy operations of the security forces that followed after the LTTE attack.

    Delft Island, the largest inhabited island of the peninsula, is conveniently located almost equidistant from Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu and Jaffna. Thus it is a valuable outpost to monitor sea and air movements not only towards Jaffna but also between Mannar and Tamil Nadu coast. It had always been under the control of navy which has anti aircraft, surveillance and security elements located there. In fact Delft Island acts as the cockpit of navy to monitor the sea traffic to Tamil Nadu from the Mannar coast and Indian boat movements around Kachchativu. In the present context, when LTTE's international supply chains are in disarray, the sea lanes of supply from Tamil Nadu have become essential in sustaining its operations. Thus the naval surveillance elements at Delft are a valuable part of peninsular defence. The LTTE's newly acquired air capability has perhaps made it also an important point in the air defence network of Jaffna.

    The Delft attack also needs to be seen in the setting of following developments in the north:

    * During the last eight months or so, the Navy has strengthened its presence in these waters and successfully managed to keep a check on LTTE Sea Tiger operations off Mannar coast. Despite repeated efforts, the Sea Tigers had not been able to make much headway. In all likelihood, surveillance elements in Delft had been playing an important role in this. This was perhaps the reason why the LTTE wanted to put them out of action. The small force of about 16 LTTE boats used to carryout the strike and the completion of the actual operation in an hour (though the disengagement process appears to have taken much longer) would indicate that it was a commando raid rather than a full scale operation to capture and hold territory. (In any case, it is doubtful whether at present the LTTE has the capability to capture and hold the island which has an area of about 42 square kilometres.)

    * LTTE had been infiltrating its cadres in penny packets into Jaffna for sometime now. They had been establishing cache of weapons and taking up opportunity targets, using irregular tactics. Aware of the danger of allowing free run to such elements security forces have been carrying out vigorous search operations frequently. Even as we write there is a search operation in progress in Thenmarachi. The security forces have also killed a few cadres in encounters in the region. A few cadres have been apprehended in round ups and security screenings. By and large these LTTE cadres appear to operate in small teams of three-four persons armed with rifle, grenade and, at times Claymore mines. Weapons stashed away for their use in Jaffna have also been recovered in quite a few cases. LTTE snipers and operatives have also managed to inflict some casualties on troops along forward defended lines particularly in Thenmarachi area. Apart from this, one can see the hands of LTTE agent provocateurs in acts like the torching of a bus in Jaffna, and stirring up of student trouble in the university, in order to prevent Jaffna from coming to terms with a restricted life disrupted after the closure of A9 highway.

    * Security forces operations to open up the Omanthai-Madhu-Mannar axis have been inching their way forward for sometime. In the course of these operations, LTTE has lost some important leaders though the claims of inflicting high casualties by both sides could not be corroborated. As I had stated in my earlier papers, further advance of security forces along this axis could threaten LTTE's freedom to dominate the coast along areas north of Talaimannar. At some stage in the near future, LTTE will perhaps be compelled to contain and push back the advancing security forces. This would further reduce LTTE's reserves available for offensive operations in the north.

    * In Mullaitivu area, relentless air strikes have destroyed many LTTE assets. LTTE's efforts to infiltrate into Pulmoddai area of Trincomalee had come to naught more than once, causing loss in men and material. Similarly, LTTE's probing forays into Welioya area also have not made much headway. Sea Tigers in Mullaitivu sector have been virtually hemmed in.

    Given the above operational setting, LTTE with its morale buoyed by the disproportionately high impact of its successful air operations, had to reassert itself in a sea or land operation. The isolated surveillance and sentry posts in southern part of Delft Island offering better chances of success perhaps suited the needs of LTTE. This attack was also perhaps to remind the Jaffna citizens that LTTE is still in the reckoning, despite its seeming inability to fulfil its much touted desire to recapture Jaffna.

    A few hours after the Delft attack, LTTE carried out a claymore blast near the Colombo Port, hitting an Army bus and killing one soldier and injuring three civilians. Possibly the Army bus was the target. However, the timing of this attack soon after the Delft strike is apparently aimed at increasing the feeling of insecurity among the population.

    The Delft attack has shown that the surveillance post was not able to detect the approaching LTTE fleet of boats. Is this one more case of radars switched off in the night or the radar remaining unserviceable for want of spares? In any case it reflects poorly on the professionalism of forces manning the post. The absence of adequate response to the attack from the naval base indicates either the absence of or deficiency in contingency plans on handling surprise attacks. On the other hand, LTTE has shown considerable thought in the choice of target, and in meticulous planning and execution of operations.

    According to the LTTE spokesman LTTE had captured two anti aircraft machine guns, two machine guns, one RPG launcher and eight rifles in the Delft operations. According to the well known columnist DBS Jeyaraj, the LTTE had also managed to carry away the radar unit in addition to seizing the weapons. If this is correct it is a sizeable gain, particularly as it deprives the post of radar surveillance capability. The loss of anti-aircraft machine guns is also a serious one, as it is an extremely useful weapon for taking on targets both at sea and air. Thus Delft will be depleted of some of its surveillance and anti aircraft capabilities till the losses are made up, which could take some time. Thus it is clear that the LTTE intention was two fold to knock off the anti-aircraft and surveillance capability of Delft and augment its own anti-aircraft arsenal.

    Is the Delft attack is a curtain raiser for LTTE's Jaffna operations as some commentators have speculated? To hazard a guess, so far the ground indications of LTTE's activity appear to be more aimed at keeping the security forces at bay rather than launching an all out offensive.

    However, of greater interest to us is the increasing LTTE assertion in the neighbourhood of India. Delft has demonstrated what a surprise LTTE strike could do. Two weeks back an Indian trawler 'Sri Krishna', hijacked by LTTE in March, 2007, was sunk in Maldivian waters. On their release from custody, 11 members of its original 12-member Indian crew have confirmed that it was LTTE that had arrested them after taking over their vessel. The Tamil Nadu government had no hesitation in publicising this information, much to the dismay of LTTE sympathisers and fellow travellers in Tamil Nadu. Information from Maldives indicates that the LTTE probably seized the vessel to tranship weapons from another ship in an area well outside the beat of Indian and Sri Lankan navies. This would indicate the conscious effort of LTTE to elude Indian and Sri Lankan navies' ocean surveillance to bring in its weapons.

    With all these happenings in close proximity of Indian waters involving Indian vessels and citizens, one would have expected the Government of India to react more visibly. However, it had continued to follow its policy of maintaining a stony silence despite the act of piracy by an insurgent group involving a vessel flying the Indian flag. This is not the first act of LTTE piracy involving Indian assets. LTTE had hijacked a Jordanian ship Farah III in distress off the coast of Mullaitivu on December 23, 2006. It was carrying 14,000 tons of rice from India to South Africa which had been seized by LTTE. Then also the Government of India had ignored the whole affair. This attitude is all the more surprising, considering the readiness with which it had expressed its "concerns" as and when Indian fishing boats trespassing into Sri Lankan waters are rounded up or driven off by the Sri Lankan navy. Is there a political angle in this issue involving national security? It should not be. If so, it would be dismal because it is at the cost of national sovereignty, and security of vessels flying the Indian colours.

    (Col. R Hariharan, an intelligence specialist on South Asia, is a retired Military Intelligence officer. He served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail:

  34. Going back to the Delft island episode, I find it strange that if this radar point was so effective in detecting LTTE attempts of smuggling in arms how come it could not detect 18 craft heading towards it??? And if it did then why wasn’t all available naval and air assets sent to intercept them before they reached the island???

  35. As usual that was a well balanced analysis by Col. Hariharan and I think he is one of the few commentators on the Sri Lankan conflict that can be relied upon for accuracy and impartiality. YankeeZulu, Col. Hariharan did comment on this too. He thinks that this could be due to two thinks either the radar was switched off for an unknown reason or it was broken needing spares; another Katunayaka type situation. May be one of the other Defencenet bloggers can provide more detailed info.
    I just pray that they manage to replenish the lost radar and the AAA QUICKLY because the Delft garrison was the key surveillance point for naval activities between South India and the North.

  36. Thenews reports that the LTTE is going to start attacking Jaffna now, does not look possible.

    Firstly the the army is well entrenched in Jaffna anticipating a major offfensive. A major offensive by the LTTE would be suicidal unless they have special weapons which can do mass scale destructions.

    The attacks in colombo and other areas in the South by the RLO have just started with another being reported today in tamilnet. The idea is to divert security resources to the South. Hence the attacks would need to get more frequent and serve by the RLO. Once this is achieved then the security would need to be tightened in the South with more troops from North.

    The army can attack now in a superior position but with the international community comming strongly against the government, the armed forces are quite paralysed. Mahinda can say words to please his electroate but he needs to give the military the go ahead else they will be in a catch 22 situation.

  37. There are two things which I would like to clarify some things circulating in the net etc.

    First is the telecoms buyout by maxis which is owned by ananda krishnan. He is the son of Jaffna tamils born in malaysia. However his first wife is a thai princess and his only son is a buddisht monk. He has 2 daughters from his second wife. Hence i do not think he would be pro LTTE.

    However even thailand objected when their telecoms provider was sold to Singapore. Hence telecoms should always be government control regardless.

    There is a propogation that the LTTE tried to capture Jaffa in Aug last year. Again with all the developments I do not think so. Firstly the LTTE tried their air craft for the first time to attack pallay. The RLO was still not active. Hence unless they were overconfident (unlikely after the battles in the east), they were testing things out.

    I believe it had two objectives. One was to destroy launching pads that was causing damage to their postions, as well as weaking the lauch positions of the army. Secondly all military units have a recce battalion whom are sent in first. Acessing the damage to the battalion, planning will be done as it gives a better guide to the strenght and weakness of the other party.

  38. navindran, Do you think that we gonna sleep all these time ? Do you think your 2 kg air craft can do harm for us with your huge operation ? He he Dream on Man !

  39. Dick Head read what I am saying and stop stewing rubbish in this forum. Go to lanka news forum and indulge in this rubbish.

  40. This comment has been removed by the author.

  41. dickwijaya, this is a blog for constructive discussion about the military developments in Sri Lanka. If you insist on posting meaningless trash in the comments I suggest you try the Lankanewspapers forum. You will be with like minded people!!

  42. None of us want to move the place you all ways suggesting "lanka news forum" which is your old place ha, either Tamil net. You better move back ..

  43. Kanishka, If you also suggesting some development for the country it has to be non bias, and logical right. And you should always keep in mind this is not a ethnic conflict and this is war against terrorism. I know your point it is better to keep navindran with us for our entrainment.

  44. Jack you right. We'll make this more useful and non bias. People can come up with the naked truth rather than assumptions.

  45. Dick you have posted so many comment with no content. I believe you talents are best used in Lanka news forums. There are many pro LTTErs there whom have nothing to do and who will fight a computer warfare and entertain you.

  46. Dick, it's a war against terrorism, spurred by an ethnic conflict.


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